The question of truth is a broadly broached subject in Philosophy as it features along the entire historical and polemical growth of the discipline right from the time of the Ancients down to our Post-Modern era. Yet, the delimiting realization of being unable to register general success in our dogged attempts at truth and knowledge, mostly stares us blankly in the face, for matters on which philosophy endeavours to speculate on, are beyond the reach of definite knowledge.1 Our theories of (...) the universe open up to modifications, refutations, and further propositions, evidencing a historical development in philosophical inquiry. This generally is the growth of our science, of our knowledge. This paper critically seeks to examine Popper’s notion of verisimilitude. It takes us through the scientist’s journey from ignorance to truth, and the difference between probability and verisimilitude. It addresses the relevance of the theory of content in understanding verisimilitude, under its distinctions as quantitative and qualitative. Finally, it discusses corroboration and the criteria for theory-choice. (shrink)

Amidst the broad divergence in opinion of philosophers and scientists at understanding reality that has lent character to the historical epochs of the Philosophical enterprise, the crucial realization has always been, of the necessity of Epistemology in our entire program of making inquiry into ‘What Is’. This realization seems born out of the erstwhile problem of knowing. Epistemology, which investigates the nature, sources, limitations and validating of knowledge, offers a striking challenge here. Since we have no direct access to our (...) world around us, outside of the subjective experience offered us by our senses, we are handicapped at making comparisons of our beliefs with a concrete world, out there, or with elements of the world. Our statements about the world seem to stand alone, buffeted against the intimidating tide of possible contradicting circumstances. Our putative claims to knowledge, therefore, face the exigency of justification. Ayer, expressing the urgency of resolving this persisting lacuna, provides an alternative criterion of knowing, as ‘having the right to be sure’. Thus, it is this deep-seated concern that has evolved, over time, to become the primary thrust of the project of Epistemology, raising the controversy over which, of Epistemology or Metaphysics, is to be accorded the prime status of first philosophy. However, Aquinas is wise to build his epistemological premise on a firm metaphysical support, clarifying the needed development from being to knowledge. For, being has to first exist to constitute the object of perception, belief, and knowledge. Accordingly, our exposition of Aquinas’ epistemology will first take a cursory look at the theoretical and historical background to Aquinas’ Philosophy, before offering a general characterization of his theory of knowledge. Then, the paper will discuss his concept of sense perception as a basis for all knowing, followed closely by an analysis of cognition and Scientia. (shrink)

The target article offers anegative, eliminativistthesis, dissolving the specialness of mirroring processes into a solution of associative mechanisms. We support the authors' project enthusiastically. What they are currently missing, we argue, is apositive, generativethesis about associative learning mechanisms and how they might give way to the complex, multimodal coordination that naturally arises in social interaction.

This is a review of a lecture series by Gillian Rose on Frankfurt School critical theory, which was delivered at the University of Sussex in 1979 and is now published under the title Marxist Modernism, edited by James Gordon Finlayson and Robert Lucas Scott.

In 2009, the United States Air Force aired a series of science fiction-themed recruitment commercials on network television and their official YouTube channel. In these advertisements, the superimposition of science fiction imagery over depictions of Air Force operations frames these missions as near-future sci-fi adventure, ironically summarized by the tagline: “It’s not science fiction. It’s what we do every day.” Focusing on an early advertisement for the Air Force’s Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle, this essay explores how themes essential to the (...) science fiction genre play a role in influencing contemporary attitudes about autonomous and semi-autonomous robotic weapons, as well as the way in which the aesthetic and functional qualities of these advanced technologies are used to frame moral arguments about their use. As a reconfiguration of the near-future battleground in the guise of science fiction, the “Reaper” ad reveals the way in which science fiction has come to serve as a functional-aesthetic benchmark and cultural sounding board, against which “every day” technologies can be measured and claims about their value, ethos, and social appeal are made. This essay explores the ethical entanglements between science fiction film and video games, and military technology, and the complex role science fiction plays in influencing public attitudes towards military technologies. (shrink)

The dissident students from Oxford, who in the year 1209 settled in Cambridge, are said to have been on their way to the cathedral town of Ely. But they stayed the night in Cambridge, fell under its spell, and never left. A century earlier wool merchants from Yorkshire, travelling to the big fair in Norwich, got caught in a rain storm at the bridge across the Cam, unpacked their merchandise to let it dry, sold the lot, and thereafter made Cambridge's (...) market their journey's end. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The English Polydaedali:How Gabriel Harvey Read Late Tudor LondonNicholas PopperHarvey and GauricoIn 1590 Gabriel Harvey read his copy of Luca Gaurico's 1552 Tractatus Astrologicus, a collection of genitures and commentaries for cities and individuals.1 Harvey had spent the previous twenty-five years at Oxford and Cambridge, mastering Greek and Latin, earning renown as a rhetorician, and promoting English letters. He was a well-known partisan of the French Calvinist Peter Ramus, (...) whose works on curriculum reform had sparked vicious [End Page 351] controversies in the English universities. But Harvey read Gaurico far removed from the schools where he had acquired fame and notoriety as an orator and poet. He had recently relocated to London, where he daily faced a dense, active city unlike his native Saffron Walden and the university towns. Nevertheless he read as he always had, carefully recording his reactions in the margins of the printed text, filling blank spaces with his own commentaries on the subjects presented by Gaurico. The notes disclose an experience of reading that intervened in contemporary debates regarding technology, astrology and utility.2 They also place Harvey among a group of scholars in London in the 1590s, such as Francis Bacon and Hugh Plat, who were examining the benefits local artisans might offer the commonwealth and reconsidering the intellectual status of craft knowledge.Harvey read and annotated Gaurico on several occasions, but the particular strain of notes that I will follow, united by a common ink and hand, engages the learning and erudition of Gaurico's subjects.3 Concentrated almost [End Page 352] exclusively in Book Four, which discussed learned men, these annotations evaluate the poets, philosophers, philologists, and others whom Gaurico had canonized as especially learned.There are only spare annotations prior to Book Four. On the title page of Book Two, devoted to churchmen, Harvey observes the quality of the individuals Gaurico presented and details his own method of evaluation:The most excellent Exemplars of this century [are] in Gaurico, and Cardano: Giovio, and Guiccardini. There are as many of the wisest men as of the greatest actors. Still others live, whether inferior, equal, or superior. And it is of interest to every skillful artificer, to know those most outstanding in their class, and the most celebrated professors of all. Certainly it is very profitable to observe exquisitely the most perfect artificers either of the world or of neighboring nations, or at least of your own people, and to consider with most cunning reason what it is, where it comes from, and what is most excellent. But seriously, and solidly, and always to the point, seeing that singular things are efficacious and are useful to polytechnoscopy. It is judicious to avoid all trivial detail, and to consider only the most pregnant theorists and practitioners of operating.4The notion of a sophisticated form of active knowledge labeled "polytechnoscopy" is the most striking element of this passage. This term seems to have been Harvey's own invention, with no direct precedents; nor was it adopted or used by others after him.Harvey repeatedly referred to polytechnoscopy in his notes. A carefully designed triptych annotation on the title page of Book Four clarifies it as a category uniting practice and knowledge. To the left Harvey wrote, "it is my task to observe the most excellent examples of this age which are useful for polytechnoscopy." On the right, "a polytechnic, polymechanic, polydaedalic, and almost panepistemic book; and likewise sufficiently polychristian. For philologists should be skimmed through; while polytechnics should be examined closely; as I did not only in the Lives of Giovio, but also in those of [End Page 353] Laertius, Eunapius, Philostratus, and others."5 The related Greek descriptors "polymechanic" and "polydaedalic" shed further light on polytechnoscopy. This constellation of terms refers to a method of garnering information by deploying technical knowledge. While not a systematic discipline, its practices—active applicability, craft expertise, observation of experience—constitute a significant realm of learning.In the central panel of the triptych, Harvey notes:[I] compared [this] to Giovio's Elegies of Learned Men. Give me the best man outdoors, and his image at home. For even true life is... (shrink)

Changes in foodways were an object of literary reflection on the Roman past in the early empire. They offered a rich set of ingredients with which to characterize social, economic, and cultural change. Varro is prominent in attesting and shaping this tradition, but it is an older, and more broadly based means of narrating Roman social history. Varro developed this material in his treatise, On the Life of the Roman People, which adapted the Life of Greece of Dicaearchus of Sicilian (...) Messene, written at the beginning of the Hellenistic period. This article argues that Roman ideas of cultural and social history already took an interest in changing foodways at this time. The production, preparation, and consumption of food raised ethical and economic questions common to the milieu of Dicaearchus and to Rome in the age of the first conquest of Italy. (shrink)

Part of The Blackwell Readings in Philosophy Series, this survey of ancient philosophy explores the scope of ancient philosophy, focusing on the key philosophers and their texts, examining how the foundations of philosophy as we know it were laid.

Pamela Sue Anderson urges feminist philosophers to embrace Michèle Le Doeuff’s revaluation of women in philosophy through according “fair value” to intuition as an intellectual faculty, a view of intuition articulated by Henri Bergson. She asks whether women who follow Bergson could be given fair value along with intuition. She turns from Le Doeuff’s writings on intuition to writings by Bergson and by Beauvoir, but periodically returns to Le Doeuff herself. In the end, a picture of freedom, friendship and feminism (...) emerges from readings of all three. This is a portrait of confident and capable interactions in creativity and dynamic projects, which transform our becoming within life, on the assumption that the love of friendship is between like-minded, embodied and interrelated selves. She explores whether we transform our lives in freedom and in love between friends. Although attracted to the human – and humane – solidarity in freedom of “great souls,” as in Beauvoir’s women of action, she instead aligns herself with Le Doeuff’s critical caution against naturalizing a timelessly abstract female soul for contemporary feminist philosophers. She concludes her proposed orientation with a Le Doeuffian feminist image of living life freely for and with friends. (shrink)

We argue that the generation and enjoyment of imaginary worlds do not necessarily rely on an evolved preference for exploration. Rather, we suggest that culture is shaped by socioecological facts on the ground, and we hypothesize about the role of residential mobility, specifically, as an important factor in the popularity of imagined spaces.

ABSTRACT This article offers a major reinterpretation of the nature of interwar Marxist theory. It does so by offering a new reading of the work of Karl Korsch in the context of a network of ex-communist intellectuals. In Marxism and Philosophy, Korsch responded to the split in the labour movement with a radical new claim to Marxist orthodoxy. Rather than engaging in Marx exegesis, he aimed to turn the Marxist ‘method’ on Marxism's own history. In the narrative he constructed, Bolshevik-inspired (...) Communism appeared as the next logical step in the dialectic. But this argument rested on a historicisation of Marx's own writing that led to an unresolvable tension in Korsch's work that threatened to undermine its claim to Marxist orthodoxy. Once it is understood that Marxism was a political currency as much as a purely theoretical space of argument, Korsch's reluctance to resolve the tension one way or the other becomes understandable. This reinterpretation of Korsch's work challenges the ‘Western Marxism’ paradigm in which he has been read, showing that Korsch’s work presupposed a reading of revolutionary success and potential rather than defeat and that he did not advocate a turn to superstructural or cultural questions in the manner supposed. (shrink)

The idea of ‘counter-control’ has greatly added to Philip Pettit's theoretical framework of freedom as non-domination, not only helping Pettit to meet prominent analytical criticisms from contemporary liberal theorists, but also helping to better illuminate the possibility of ‘unmoralized’ interference without domination. But while this idea has helped to increase the attractiveness of freedom as non-domination as a philosophical ideal, it has also revealed some disparities between Pettit’s theoretical framework and the practical model of governance to which he ascribes – (...) disparities which call into question the model’s overall ability to guard against imperium and tackle the issue of political legitimacy. In this paper, I review two of these disconnects. First, I discuss how Pettit’s interpretation of ‘individualized’ influence leads him to overlook some of the institutions that would be necessary to satisfy this theoretical constraint. Second, I illustrate how Pettit fails to account for his own axiom of positionality when discussing the institutions that allow citizens to exert ‘unconditioned’ influence, or ‘control’ over legislative direction. In concluding, I draw several inferences from these arguments for neo-republicans continuing to engage in democracy-building. (shrink)